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I.

INTRODUCTION

Constitutions and statutes in the American West have long
stated that water is the property of the public or of the state.'
Nonetheless, until recent decades, most of the law on water allocation in the region has involved private utilization of the resource. Courts routinely have ignored or distorted provisions on
the public nature of water. Even in our time, the Colorado Supreme Court has concluded that state constitutional language declaring the water of every natural stream to be "the property of
the public" 2 "simply ... establishes the right of appropriation in

Professor of Law, University of California at Davis.
1. See ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 13 (all waters "reserved to the
people for common use"); COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 (water of every
*

natural stream "the property of the public"); IDAHO CONST. art. XV,
§ 1; MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 3(3) (surface, underground, flood and at-

mospheric water vested in "the state for the use of its people"); NEB.
CONST. art. XV, § 5 (use of the water of every natural stream "dedicated to the people"); N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2 (unappropriated water
of natural streams declared to "belong to the public"); WYO. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1 (water of all natural streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water "the property of the state"); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-141A (West 1966) (waters "belong to the public"); CAL. WATER
CODE § 102 (West 1971) (water "the property of the people"); IDAHO
CODE § 42-101 (1993) (waters flowing in their natural channels are "the
property of the state"; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-702 (1989) (all water
"dedicated to the use of the people"); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 533.025
(Michie 1995) (water "belongs to the public"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 6101-01 (1995)

(all waters "belong to the public"); OR. REv. STAT.

§ 537.110 (1988) (all water "belongs to the public"); S.D. CODIFIED
LAws § 46-1-3 (Michie 1987) (all water "the property of the public");
TEX.

WATER CODE

ANN. § 11.021 (West 1988) (water of every flowing

river or natural stream "the property of the state"); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 73-1-1 (1989) (all waters "the property of the public"); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 90.03.010 (West 1992) (subject to existing rights, all waters
"belong to the public").
2. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5. The Colorado constitution adds that
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3

this state."
Instead of accepting water as public property and working out
the implications of that concept for the private use rights in
water which have been recognized from the time of non-Indian
settlement in the area,4 courts have put practically all their emphasis on the private use rights. The dominant type of water
right in the West has been the "appropriative" right, which permits - indeed, in most instances, requires - the holder of the
right to divert water from the source and put it to beneficial
use.5 Mining, irrigation, and municipal water supply have been
typical beneficial uses. The instream benefits of water, until recently, have been largely ignored.
Massive diversion of water from natural sources, often combined with the draining of wetlands, has led to the widespread
loss of natural values throughout the West. In California's San
Joaquin Valley, for example, water diversion and land reclamation have led to the obliteration of Tulare Lake, once an aquatic
area of hundreds of thousands of acres.6 Later on in California,
on the eastern side of the Sierra Nevada mountain range, a
water project built and operated by the City of Los Angeles
caused the drying up of Owens Lake, previously an important

water in natural streams "is dedicated to the use of the people of the
state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided." Id.
3. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Colo. 1979) (upholding
a criminal trespass conviction of persons who floated across a privately
owned ranch on the Colorado River and whose feet occasionally
touched the bed of the river).
4. See

ROBERT G.

DuNBAR,

FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS

3, 4 (1983).
5. See generally 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS pt.III (Robert E. Beck
ed., 1991)
6. In early California, Tulare Lake was larger than Lake Tahoe and
home to "an abundance of fish and vast quantities of turtles that ended up in rich soups and stews." NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT
THIRST: CALIFORNIANS AND WATER, 1770s - 1990s, at 5 (1992). Tulare
Lake once had a surface area of about 200,000 acres; after the flood of
1862, however, it spread to 486,400 acres. See STEPHEN JOHNSON ET AL.,
THE GREAT CENTRAL VALLEY- CALIFORNIA'S HEARTLAND 157 (1993). Buena

Vista, Kern and Goose Lakes, to the south of Tulare Lake, have also
disappeared in the path of agricultural development. See id.
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habitat for waterfowl. 7 Just a few years ago, again in the San Joaquin Valley, the disposal of contaminated agricultural drainage
in a wildlife refuge led to an environmental debacle at
Kesterson.'
Severe environmental degradation from the impact of water
projects and related activity has not been limited to California. A
series of multi-purpose dams on the Colorado River System has
led to degradation of the Colorado River delta, once home to
lagoons which supported many wildlife species, including jaguar.9
Extensive development of the Columbia River and its tributaries,
particularly for hydropower, has brought about listings under the
Endangered Species Act.10 Similar consequences exist regarding
the Truckee River in Nevada, the Sevier River in Utah,12 and
13
many other lakes and rivers throughout the West.

7. See WILLIAM L. KAHRL,

WATER AND POWER: THE CONFLICT OVER

35-36 (1982). Currently, in connection with a plan to restore a portion of the lower
Owens River, creation of a 350-acre estuary at the point where the river
reaches Owens Lake is being considered. See Jeff Putman, Who Wins
When a River Returns?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Feb. 17, 1997, at 4.
8. See TOM HARRIS, DEATH IN THE MARSH 1-43 (1991); Felix E.

Los ANGELES' WATER SUPPLY IN THE OWENS VALLEY

Smith, The Kesterson Effect: Reasonable Use of Water and the Public Trust, 6
SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 45 (1996).
9. See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTRY ALMANAC 141-49 (1966)
(reporting on wildlife abundance during a 1922 visit); see also PHILIP L.
FRADIN, A RIVER No MORE 320-21 (1981).
10. See Michael C. Blumm, Columbia River Basin, in 6 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS pt. XI, at 57, 105-11 (Robert E. Beck ed., 1994 replacement volume).

11. See Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Managing Reclamation Facilities for
Ecosystem Benefits, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 197, 205-06 (1996). The Truckee
River terminates at Pyramid Lake. MacDonnell notes that Lake Winnemuca, which once served as "a kind of overflow catchment from Pyramid Lake" and which once contained over three million acre-feet of

water, has dried up completely as a result of water development. Id. at
205. Stampede Dam, a federal reclamation facility in the area, is operated for species preservation. Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist.
v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257, 262 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1083
(1985).
12. See

MARC REISNER & SARAH BATES, OVERTAPPED OASIS: REFORM

OR REVOLUTION FOR WESTERN WATER 44 (1990).

13. See generally

NATURAL RESOURCES LAW CTR., RESTORING THE
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THE BEGINNINGS OF CHANGE

Blatant disregard for the environmental consequences of the

exercise of water rights was possible in the last century, 14 and indeed in this century through World War II. But eventually, public attitudes began to change. For example, in 1913 John Muir
had lost his celebrated battle to prevent federal authorization of
a water project for San Francisco in Yosemite National Park,"s
while in the 1950s David Brower won his fight to stop Echo Park
Dam, which would have affected the Dinosaur National
16

Monument.
As public attitudes began to shift, changes in legal doctrine regarding water resources also began to occur. The California legislature, for example, imposed water bypass requirements on dam
owners for the protection of downstream fish populations,1 7 and

WEST'S WATERS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE BUREAu OF RECLAMATION (1996).

For examples of the same pattern outside the United States, see EDWARD GOLDSMITH & NICHOLAS HILDYARD, THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS OF LARGE DAMS (1983).

14. See People v. Gold Run Ditch & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138
(1884), which enjoined the deposit of hydraulic mining debris in California's rivers, is sometimes cited as a nineteenth century "environmental" case. See, e.g., Marilyn Ziebarth, California'sFirst EnvironmentalBattle,
CAL. LAw., Aug. 1984, at 56. Although undoubtedly that decision
brought environmental benefits, it was handed down to relieve farmers
and cities from the adverse impacts of the hydraulic mining debris
clogging river channels and causing floods. Protecting the integrity of

rivers for their natural values was not an issue. See generally ROBERT L.
KELLEY, GOLD VS. GRAIN: THE HYDRAuLIc MINING CONTROVERSY IN CALIFORNIA'S SACRAMENTO VALLEY

(1959) (recounting the California farmers'

long struggle to halt the damage done by hydraulic mining operations
in the Sierra Nevada mountains).
15. See HUNDLEY, supra note 6, at 169-83.
16. See id. at 307. At the time David Brower was the Executive Director of the Sierra Club. To Brower's later regret, in obtaining deletion of the Echo Park project, the Sierra Club acquiesced in a dam on
the Colorado River at Glen Canyon. See id.; see also JOHN MCPHEE, ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ARCHDRUID 163 (1990).
17. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE ,§ 5937 (expanding upon earlier
provisions), 5946 (linking bypass requirements to water rights granted
in one part of the state) (West 1984); see also California Trout, Inc. v.
State Water Resources Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 189, 192-93 (Ct.
App. 1989) (noting that the code was amended and strengthened in
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it also provided that use of water for fish and wildlife is beneficial.18 In the years that (followed, other enactments by western
states provided that appropriative water rights could, in some circumstances, be obtained without the necessity of the traditional
diversion or impoundment. 19
None of these changes, however, has made much difference
for the operation of the dams and other water project facilities
already constructed. These continue to have a myriad of detrimental environmental consequences. Many block access to upstream spawning areas for anadromous fish, alter and sometimes
even eliminate downstream flows, modify temperature regimes
and otherwise damage environmental values. Most of these consequences of water projects were initially ignored in the rush to
"put water to work." 20 To declare fish protection a beneficial use
or to permit a necessarily junior appropriation for instream flow
purposes has done nothing to alter the adverse consequences of
the thousands of dams already constructed and in operation. To
change these projects, more powerful tools have been and will
be needed, as well as a political environment that permits those
tools to be employed effectively.
III.

FIRST SHOTS IN THE REVOLUTION

California has been the leader in the current revolution in
western water law, with the first significant battle being fought
over the water resources of the Mono Basin. 21 This small basin

1953 in response to the drying up of the Owens River Gorge).
18. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West 1971 & Supp. 1997).
19. See INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION IN THE WEST (Lawrence J.

MacDonnell & Teresa A. Rice eds., rev. ed. 1993).
20. In 1945, in a speech to a California Water Conference, Governor Earl Warren aptly stated the water ethic of earlier years as follows:
"In my opinion we should not relax until California has adopted and
put into operation a statewide program that will put every drop of
water to work." Quoted in Joel W. Hedgpeth, The Passingof the Salmon,
in CALIFORNIA'S SALMON AND STEELHEAD: THE STRUGGLE TO RESTORE AN

IMPERILED RESOURCE 52, 59 (Alan Lufkin ed., 1991).

21. For a splendid account of this controversy through 1994, see
JOHN HART, STORM OVER MONO CALIFORNIA WATER FuTuRE (1996).

THE MONO LAKE BATTLE AND THE
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lies to the north of the Owens Valley, due east of Yosemite National Park, just at the western edge of the arid Great Basin. 22 Its
principal feature is the highly saline Mono Lake, but the legal
battle has been about the fresh water in several creeks tributary
to the lake. Most of the water in those creeks is derived from the
normally ample snowpack in the Sierra Nevada mountains to the
west.23
Earlier in this century, the City of Los Angeles, to augment its
municipal water supply so as to allow for future growth, secured
water rights for virtually the entire flow of four of the five major
creeks in the Mono Basin. These are appropriative rights recognized by licenses issued by California's State Water Resources
Control Board (SWRCB). They allow the city to divert water
from the basin and to export it to Los Angeles via the Owens
River and the Los Angeles Aqueduct.
Although in the 1930s some feared Los Angeles' Mono Basin
project would dry up Mono Lake entirely, 24 just as Owens Lake
had been dried up to the south, 25 the environmental consequences of water export from the Mono Basin have been somewhat less dramatic. The resultant water level decline, however,
has led to loss of waterfowl habitat, increased salinity levels that
have threatened invertebrates serving as a food source for several
bird species, predator access to nesting areas and some toxic
dust storms fed by material from the newly exposed lake shore 36

22. The Great Basin is an enormous region of desert mountain
ranges and valleys. It includes the western half of Utah, most of Nevada, and portions of Arizona, California, Idaho and Oregon. See THE
COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 1127 (Barbara A. Chernow & George A. Vallasi
eds., 5th ed. 1993).
23. For a comprehensive report on conditions in the Sierra Nevada, see SIERRA NEVADA ECOSYSTEM PROJECT SCIENCE TEAM AND SPECIAL
CONSULTANTS, CENTERS FOR WATER AND WILDLAND RESOURCES AT UNIVERFINAL RESITY OF CALIFORNIA, DAVIS, STATUS OF THE SIERRA NEVADA PORT TO CONGRESS

(1996).

24. See HART, supra note 21, at 42.
25. See KAHRL, supra note 7, at 35-36.
26. See CALIFORNIA ST. WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BD., DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT FOR THE REVIEW OF THE MONO BASIN WATER
RIGHTS OF THE CITY OF Los ANGELES (1993) (three volumes, with twenty-

eight supporting reports) [hereinafter CAL. WATER BD. (1993)]. See also
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Additionally, dried up creeks have brought not only significant
changes in riparian conditions, but also the loss of celebrated
27
fisheries of non-native trout.

In former times, these detrimental environmental consequences would have been accepted as the price of progress, but
28
not so for the Mono Basin. Scientific studies, first in the 1960s,
and more visibly in the 1970s and 1980s, 29 documented the ongoing threats to both wildlife and human health. Activists prevailed upon a major law firm to take up their cause - one that,
in the late 1970s, seemed virtually impossible to win given what
seemed the rock-solid water rights position of Los Angeles. After
all, the city, with the full support of both the state and federal
governments, had perfected property rights to a large part of the
fresh water resources of the Mono Basin and was putting that
water to reasonable beneficial use as required by the norms of
the appropriative doctrine and California's anti-waste constitutional provisions. 30 Those constitutional provisions had, in fact,
been provoked by the desire to minimize the "loss" of fresh waters into saline waters such as those of Mono Lake,31 just the sort
of loss the city's water project seemed to be reducing.
Despite the odds against a successful challenge to the Mono
Basin water diversions, within a dozen years of initiating litigation the environmental challengers had obtained some prelimi-

the two volume final EIR published in 1994.
27. See id.

28. See David T. Mason, Limnology of Mono Lake, California
(1966) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, U. Cal. Davis).
29. See, e.g., DANIEL BOTKIN ET AL., THE FUTURE OF MONO LAKE:. REPORT OF THE COMMUNrIY AND ORGANIZATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE "BLUE
RIBBON PANEL"
NIA

(David

(1988);

AN ECOLOGICAL STUDY OF MONO LAKE, CALIFOR-

W. Winkler ed., 1977);

NAT'L ACAD. SCI., MONo BASIN EcosYs-

TEM STUDY COMM. OF THE NAT'L REs. COUNCIL, THE MONO BASIN EcosysTEM: EFFECTS OF CHANGING LAKE LEVEL

(1987).

CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2.
31. See Harrison C. Dunning, Article X, Section 2: From Maximum
Water Development to Instream Flow Protection, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
275, 276 (1989); see also Brian E. Gray, "In Search of Bigfoot": The Common Law Origins of Article X, Section 2 of the California Constitution, 17

30. See

HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 225 (1989).
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nary judicial relief. 32 By 1994, the SWRCB had issued an order
greatly limiting exports and providing for both waterfowl habitat
and stream restoration. 33 Many developments seem to have influenced this result: a sense that California's water rights law was
outdated and needed reform,34 the fact that the activist Mono
Lake Committee centered much of its work in Los Angeles, 35 the
existence of reasonable means for the city to deal with the prospective loss of Mono Basin supplies, 36 and the city's consistent
intransigence on the issue and its increasing isolation within the
California community of water development agencies. 37 But one
key element in bringing about substantial reoperation of the
Mono Basin facilities clearly was doctrinal innovation and evolution in the California courts regarding water law.
Of greatest significance was judicial approval of the point
made by environmentalists that the public trust doctrine, a notion that sovereign property rights to navigable waters and the
land beneath them should be exercised to protect public access
and enjoyment, has a role to play with regard to water rights.
California courts long ago had acknowledged the relevance of
the public trust doctrine regarding fill placed in navigable waters
in a way which destroys or severely limits public access to those
waters. 3 In litigation challenging Mono Basin water diversions,
32. See HART, supra note 21, at 130-31.
33. See STATE OF CAL. WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BD., MONO LAKE
BASIN WATER RIGHT DECISION 1631 - DECISION AND ORDER AMENDING
WATER RIGHT LICENSES TO ESTABLISH FISHERY PROTECTION FLOWS IN
STREAMS TRIBUTARY TO MONO LAKE AND TO PROTECT PUBLIC TRUST RE-

(1994) [hereinafter CAL. WATER BD. (1994)].
34.. See generally GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA
WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT (1978).
35. See HART, supra note 21, at 99-100.
36. See CAL. WATER BD. (1993), supra note 26, ch. L3.
37. See HART, supra note 21, at 164. Indeed, within the city the Department of Water and Power, operator of the Mono Basin facilities,
over time lost support from members of the city council and the
mayor. See id, at 120, 173-74.
38. The earliest judicial acknowledgement of the public trust doctrine in California came with regard to fill placed in San Francisco Bay.
See Eldridge v. Cowell, 4 Cal. 80 (1854); see also Craig Labadie, Note, Increased Public Trust Protectionfor California's Tidelands - City of Berkeley v.
SOURCES AT MONO LAKE AND IN THE MONO LAKE BASIN
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environmentalists made the point that destruction of a lake by
diversion of its inflow was similar to destruction of the same lake
by filling it in. Logically, they argued, award of a public trust
doctrine remedy in the latter case should require award of the
39
same remedy in the former case.
Although logic supported the environmentalists' point, history
did not. In California no court had ever limited the exercise of a
water right in the name of the public trust doctrine, 4° and in the
Mono Basin litigation, the state's Attorney General argued strenuously that any public trust doctrine had been absorbed by the
overriding constitutional policy that the waste of water must be
avoided. 41 But the California Supreme Court rejected that viewpoint,42 concluding that an accommodation must be reached between appropriative water rights benefitting diverters and the
public trust doctrine benefitting the general public in its use of
water in place. In 1983 the court ruled that "whenever feasible"
the exercise of appropriative water rights is subject to limitation
43
to protect public trust values such as preservation.
IV.

SUBSTANTIAL

PROJECT

REOPERATION: THE MONO BASIN

The doctrinal innovation of the 1983 Mono Basin ruling eventually led to important modifications of project operation. In
1985, challengers of the hegemony of Los Angeles in the basin
opened a second front: persons interested in flows in the tributaSuperior Court, 14 U.C. DAvIS L. REv. 399 (1980).

39. This point had earlier been made in Ralph W. Johnson, Public
Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAviS L. REv.
233, 257-58 (1980).

40. Outside of California, the decision most on point was United
Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457 (N.D. 1976). United Plainsmen did not, however, involve a perfected

water right.
41. See Roderick E. Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water
Rights Context: The Wrong Environmental Remedy, 22 SAmTA CLARA L. REv.

63 (1982). Walston, who argued the Mono Basin case on behalf of the
State Water Resources Control Board, maintained the public trust doctrine is "substantively neutral." Id. at 93.
42. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct. of Alpine County,
658 P.2d 709, 728 n.28 (Cal. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
43. Id. at 728.
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ries for their significance in maintaining fish life - as opposed
to their value in contributing to a lake level and quality deemed
necessary for bird life in the basin - invoked certain provisions
of the California Fish and Game Code, which require dam operators to release sufficient water to keep downstream fish in
"good" condition. 44 Although those provisions can be regarded
as a partial codification of the public trust doctrine developed by
the judiciary,45 they apply as written with no need for "accommodation" of the prior appropriation doctrine. 46 The interim relief
they allowed meant that for the first time since Los Angeles began its Mono Basin water project it had to operate with a direct
constraint on the exercise of its water rights.
For many years lawyers for the environmental plaintiffs in the
Mono Basin litigation had fought to remain in the courts - particularly, the federal courts47 - and conversely to keep the dispute away from the SWRCB. In 1989, however, a judicial stay was
issued to allow the SWRCB to examine both the lake level and
the creek flow components of the case. 48 The SWRCB spent several years preparing a massive Environmental Impact Report on
the situation pursuant to the California Environmental Quality
Act. 49 Thereafter, it conducted a lengthy evidentiary hearing
prior to announcement of its order on September 28, 1994.
The SWRCB's Mono Basin water rights decision,50 which no
party chose to appeal to the courts,5 1 substantially changed the licenses pursuant to which Los Angeles diverts water in the basin.
Practically no diversion is permitted until the lake returns to a
specified elevation; thereafter, diversions are expected to average

CAL. FISH & GAME CODE §§ 5937, 5946 (West 1984).
45. See California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd.,
255 Cal. Rptr. 184,, 210-13 (Ct. App. 1989).
46. Id. at 206-08.
47. See HART, supra note 21, at 103, 131; see also National Audubon
Soc'y v. Department of Water, 869 E2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting
federal common law nuisance theory asserted by National Audubon Society regarding interstate air pollution).
48. See HART, supra note 21, at 131.

44.

49. See id. at 136-38;

CAL. WATER BD.

(1993), supra note 26.

50. CAL WATER BD. (1994), supra note 33.
51. See HART, supra note 21, at 173-75.
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52
well below half of those which occurred before the litigation.
Furthermore, an affirmative obligation requires the city to prepare plans for the restoration of the creeks and waterfowl habitat
areas, exercises which require more than the simple release of
water into the creeks.53 All in all, the operation of the municipal
water supply facilities has now been radically altered; restoration
and maintenance of a desired ecosystem is now a precondition
for the realization of any further water supply or power production benefits for the city.

V.

PROJECT REOPERATION IN A MORE COMPLEX SETTING: THE
DELTA PUMPS

In several ways the Mono Basin situation is quite simple. There
is only one major diverter, the City of Los Angeles; the applicable law is mostly state law; and the amount of water at stake is in the context of the massive water development characteristic of
California - small. 54 In contrast, the Bay-Delta water controversy
is exceedingly complex. There are many major diverters from
the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta (the "Delta") and its tributary
56
rivers;55 important federal laws, notably the Clean Water Act
and the Endangered Species Act,57 interact with state law on ripa-

rian water rights, appropriative water rights, water quality, the
public trust doctrine, and other matters;58 and a large part of the
52. See id. at 171-73.
53. See id. at 171. Early in 1997, the State Water Resources Control
Board opened hearings on the draft restoration plans submitted by Los
Angeles.
54. See 1 DEP'T WATER RESOURCES, CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE,

49 (1994) (California's estimated average annual runoff is about

71,000,000 acre-feet, of which in 1990 about 35% was developed for irrigated agriculture, urban and other uses); CAL. WATER BD. (1993), supra
note 26, at 3A-14. Records maintained by Los Angeles indicate that
from April 1940, the year water rights were granted, to March 1989 an
average of 65,400 acre-feet of water was exported annually from the
Mono Basin. See id.
55. See generally STATE OF CALIFORNIA, THE CALIFORNIA WATER ATLAS
104-06 (William L. Kahrl ed., 1979) [hereinafter CAL. WATER ATLAS].
56. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
57. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994).
58. See United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227
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state's developed water supply passes through the Delta on its
way to parts of the San Francisco Bay Area, the San Joaquin Val59
ley and Southern California.
A major water quality problem in the Delta is maintenance of
an appropriate salinity balance. Salinity intrusion into the interior of the Delta - a much-altered landscape which has gone
from rule marshes to numerous levee-protected islands used for
farming - was an issue long before large federal and state water
projects began pumping water from the southern end of the
Delta for export,60 but the export pumps have greatly exacerbated the problem. 61 Farmers and industries within the Delta, agricultural and urban users of the exported water, and important
fish species all need either fresh water or an appropriately located low salinity zone to prosper, so control of the estuarine
area where the salt and fresh waters meet is of critical significance to many interests. 62
Salinity standards for the Delta are set pursuant to state and
federal water quality laws, but they are implemented through
conditions placed on water rights pursuant to state law.63 An impasse of sorts occurred in recent years when the federal Environmental Protection Agency had disapproved portions of the state's
Delta salinity standards as inadequate to protect fish and wildlife
and, pursuant to the Clean Water Act, was preparing its own salinity standards but lacked a ready means of implementing those
standards."4 To further complicate the situation, listings under
the federal Endangered Species Act had led to consultations and
biological opinions which placed operational limits on the Delta
pumps.

Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 1986); Elizabeth Ann Rieke, The Bay-Delta Accord: A Stride Toward Sustainability, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 341 (1996).
59. See CAL WATER ATLAS, supra note 55, at 104.
60. See, e.g., Town of Antioch v. Williams Irrigation Dist., 205 P. 688
(Cal. 1922).
61. See CAL. WATER ATLAS, supra note 55, at 104.
62. See Rieke, supra note 58, at 343-44.
63. See United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 227
Cal. Rptr. 161, 187 (Ct. App. 1986).
64. See Rieke, supra note 58, at 354-55.
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At the eleventh hour - or, better, a stroke before midnight federal and state negotiators late in 1994 reached an agreement
on a three-year "truce" memorialized in joint state-federal Principles for Agreement. 65 These provide, in effect, for integration of
water quality and endangered species requirements and a coordinated state-federal approach to implementation of those requirements through restrictions on pumping in the southern Delta
and other measures. Export limits are included, as are requirements that water be released from reservoirs to achieve water
quality objectives. 66 Although the project reoperation in this instance is less drastic than in the Mono Basin, the changes are significant. And they have led to a major current effort to study the
Delta system with an eye to improvements in the environment,
water supply reliability, water quality and system (e.g. levee)
vulnerability.6 7
VI.

REOPERATION RESISTED: THE

CVPIA

One of the federal government's most substantial water
projects in the West is the Central Valley Project (CVP) in California.6s Like most water projects of its time, 69 it was built with

evident disregard for its environmental impacts. 70 The conse65. Id. at 348-49.
66. See STATE WATER RESOURCES CONTROL BD, WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN FOR THE SAN FRANcIsCO BAY/SACRAMENTO-SAN JOAQUIN DELTA

ESTUARY 27-42 (1995).
67. See CALFED Bay-Delta Program, Phase I Final Report (1996);
Mary Scoonover & Richard Frank, The CAHFED Bay-Delta Program:A New
Model for Western Resource Planning & Decision-Making, CWAG REP., Winter 1997, at 4.
68. BuREAu OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T INTERIOR, CENTRAL VALLEY
PROJECT: ITS HISTORICAL BACKGROUND & ECONOMIC IMPACT (1981). The
CVP includes pumps in the southern Delta discussed in Part V above.
69. Work on the CVP began in 1937, although World War II prevented water from the Delta from being delivered to the San Joaquin
Valley until 1951. See HUNDLEY, supra note 6, at 254-55. In 1947 Friant
Dam, located on the San Joaquin River, began storing water. See GENE
ROSE, SAN JOAQUIN A RIVER BETRAYED 101 (1992).

70. See Harrison C. Dunning, Confronting the EnvironmentalLegacy of
Irrigated Agriculture in the West: The Case of the Central Valley Project, 23
ENVTL. L. 943, 950 (1993).
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quences for fish species have been particularly severe.7"
In 1992 Congress included in water project legislation7 2 a
lengthy tide known as the Central Valley Project Improvement
Act (CVPIA). 73 This act reauthorized the CVP with a new set of
project purposes: for example, stating for the first time that fish
and wildlife mitigation, protection, and restoration would have
the same priority as irrigation. 74 Keeping with this "new look" for
the CVP, Congress, pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 75 mandated the preparation of a Programmatic

71. Plans for Friant Dam originally included hydroelectric power
generation, which would have served to maintain a regular flow of
water downstream of the dam. However, that feature was deleted early
in construction. See ROSE, supra note 69, at 100. Subsequently state officials decided that no water releases would be required to maintain the
downstream fishery. See id. at 102-104; see also 18 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 31
(1951). Aside from flood years, only small amounts of water are released from Friant Dam, enough to satisfy the rights of riparians between Friant Dam and Gravelly Ford (37 miles downstream). See Leland
0. Graham, The Central Valley Project: Resource Development of a Natural
Basin, 38 CAL. L. REv. 588, 598-99 (1950). With virtually no water in the
San Joaquin River below Gravelly Ford in most years, and with no fish
passage facilities at the dam, spring-run salmon which once summered
in the headwaters above Friant Dam have become extinct. See George
Warner, Remember the San Joaquin, in CALIFORNIA'S SALMON AND STEELHEAD - THE STRUGGLE TO RESTORE AN IMPERILED RESOURCE 61, 68 (Alan

Lufkin ed., 1991).
72. Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act, Pub.
L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43 U.S.C.) (hereinafter Projects Act). See Todd G. Glass, The
1992 Omnibus Water Act: Three Rubrics of Reclamation Reform, 22 EcoLoGc
L.Q. 143 (1995).
73. Projects Act § 3401.
74. Projects Act § 3406(a). Although earlier the situation had been
debatable, the Bureau of Reclamation, which administers the CVP, had
taken the position that project water for fish and wildlife was authorized but subordinate to irrigation and other statutorily recognized pur-

poses. Central Valley Project Imprmement Act: Hearings on S.484 Before the
Subcomm. on Water and Power of the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural
Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 426-27 (1991). Note that fish and wildlife "enhancement" is given a lower priority by CVPIA than "mitigation, protection and restoration," one equivalent to power production.
Projects Act § 3406(a) (2).
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4327 (1994).
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Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) prior to the renewal of
76
any existing long-term water supply contracts.
At the heart of the CVPIA, however, are directions for changes
in key CVP facilities, which are prerequisites for new water supply contracts. 77 Some of these directions relate to physical improvements of water project facilities; 78 others involve the establishment of firm water supplies for wildlife areas in the Central
Valley, as in for example, the Grassland Resources Conservation
79
District.
Two CVPIA reoperation directions of central importance have
not to date been implemented as Congress apparently intended.
One was to dedicate a minimum of 800,000 acre-feet of CVP
water for fish, wildlife, water quality and habitat restoration purposes under the management of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service;80 the other, to develop and implement a program to double
anadromous fish population levels by the year 2002.81 Initially the

76. See Projects Act § 3404(c). Interim renewal contracts, subject to
certain new requirements, are however permitted. Id.
77. See id. § 3404(a). For what is arguably the CVP's most serious
environmental impact, the complete drying up most years of the San
Joaquin River below Gravelly Ford, the CVPIA, however, required only
development of a plan. See id. § 3406(c) (1). Even that has been cut
short by Congressional commands denying funding for plan preparation. See 141 CONG. REC. H10,949 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1995) (Conference
Report on H.R. 1905, Energy and Water Development Appropriation
Act, 1996).
78. For example, to construct fish screens at unscreened diversions
and to install a temperature control device at Shasta Dam. See Projects
Act § 3406(b) (6).
79. See Projects Act § 3406(d). See also § 3406(b) (23) on firm instream flows for the Trinity River. These flows are designed to fulfill
the federal government's trust duty to the Hoope Valley Tribe. See id.
80. See Projects Act § 3406(b) (2). The 800,000 acre-feet figure was
a compromise - the chair of the Senate Committee on Energy and
Natural Resources had Originally proposed a dedication for environmental purposes of 1,500,000 acre-feet. See Phillip A. Davis, Congress
Seeks to Rechannel flow of Water in the West, 50 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 527,
532 (1992). Note that the 800,000 figure can be reduced by up to 25
percent in the event drought means reductions occur for agricultural
deliveries of CVP water. See Projects Act § 3406(b) (2) (C).
81. See Projects Act § 3406(b) (1). The program requires "all reasonable efforts" toward the doubling goal. See id.
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environmental dedication was successfully challenged on NEPA
grounds, 82 but a federal district court's preliminary injunction of
the dedication was vacated on appeal.8 3 More serious for project
reoperation to ensure implementation of the dedication, however, are disputes over the meaning of the dedication language.
Some of these go to whether there will be accounting procedures used to sort out how CVP yield is allocated, while others
deal with the availability of dedicated water in dry years and
whether any CVP water reallocated from contractors needs to be
made up at a later date. There is also disagreement on whether
water used to accomplish an upstream flow objective can be "recaptured" for out-of-stream use when it reaches the Delta - if
so, an obvious incentive to find upstream environmental uses for
the dedication is created. As of this writing, these disputes are
unresolved and block progress toward achieving the environmental goals of the legislation.
The two centrally important CVPIA reoperation directions
mentioned above are related, for one use of the environmental
dedication water would be to help achieve the Act's anadromous
fish doubling goal. Pursuant to the doubling mandate, in December 1995 the Fish and Wildlife Service released a draft Anadromous Fish Restoration Program ("AFRP") which identified over
one hundred actions beneficial for anadromous fish which utilize
Central Valley waterways. Some of these can be done at no water
cost to CVP contractors, for example, restoration of spawning
gravels in tributary streams. Others do carry a cost to CVP contractors, for example, reduction of water exports from the Delta
when the anadromous fish are most at risk from such pumping.
As of this writing, final decisions have not been made on implementation of the AFRP, but the inclination of the Bureau of Reclamation seems to be to favor non-water related measures and,
for those which cost contractors water, to favor upstream measures (which allow "recapture") over Delta measures.

82. Westlands Water Dist. v. United States, 850 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D.
Cal. 1994).
83. Westlands Water Dist. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 43
F.3d 457 (9th Cir. 1994).
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As noted above, California currently is the leader in the ongoing revolution in western water law, with the dramatic reoperation of Mono Basin water facilities belonging to the City of Los
Angeles being the most dramatic single example of modification
of a water supply project to achieve environmental goals. The
Bay-Delta and CVPIA examples discussed above are less clear-cut,
but each holds promise of significant project reoperation for environmental benefits. California is not alone, however, in these
efforts. A recent detailed study of fifteen selected federal reclamation projects scattered throughout the west found substantial
change occurring at a number of them, a result of "the increased attention now paid to the in-place values of water for
4
such things as fisheries."1

VII.

COUNTER-REVOLUTION

Water supply is a critical component of both urban life and agriculture. Because municipal prosperity and success in irrigated
farming require reliable water supplies, changes in water supply
projects to enhance environmental quality will be contentious.
For fifteen years Los Angeles adamantly resisted environmentalists' legal and political efforts to bring change in the Mono Basin,8 5 while water users dependent on exports from the Delta
have frequently used litigation and other means to resist any reductions.8 6 Those adversely affected by the CVPIA have both
88
sued8 7 and sought to weaken the act by amendments.

84. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Managing Reclamation Facilities for
Ecosystem Benefits, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 197, 201 (1996). This article summarizes much of the study, with attention given to reform of reclamation projects on the Truckee and Carson Rivers of California and Nevada, the Yakima River of Washington, and the Upper Colorado River

of Colorado. Results of the full study are provided in
L. CENTER., RESTORING THE WEST'S
REAU OF RECLAMATION (1996).

NAT. RESOURCES

WATERS: OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE

Bu-

85. See HART, supra note 21, passim.
86. See, e.g., United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd.,
227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (Ct. App. 1986).
87. See, e.g., Westlands Water Dist. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 43 E3d 457 (9th Cir. 1994).
88. See, e.g., H.1L 1906, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 2738, 104th Cong.
(1995).
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Counter-revolution, however, is more than resistance to
change. It is a proactive reaching out to seize the initiative: to
destroy that which is threatening. The best example of a counterrevolution regarding contemporary reform of western water
projects is found in Idaho.
As noted above, the doctrinal basis for the Mono Basin water
project changes was the use of the public trust doctrine to limit
the exercise of appropriative water rights. Shortly after the California Supreme Court decided that both the public trust doctrine and the appropriations doctrine are part of California
water rights law,8 9 the Idaho Supreme Court in dicta endorsed
that idea. 90 No water rights were actually limited in Idaho, and
indeed in the massive Snake River Basin Adjudication, environmental groups were denied standing to raise public trust claims. 91
Nonetheless, in 1996 at the behest of irrigation organizations and
others, a statute enacted in Idaho purported to overturn this
case law by providing that the public trust doctrine "shall not apply" to the appropriation or use of water or to the granting,
92
transfer, administration or adjudication of water rights.
The Idaho public trust legislation is suspect on several theories: (1) that it is an improper give-away of public rights rooted
in sovereignty; (2) that it violates federal constraints rooted in
the constitutional equal footing doctrine; and (3) that it is inconsistent with the public use clause of the Idaho Constitution." If
89. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
90. Kootenai Envd. Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d
1085, 1094 (Idaho 1983).
91. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. State, 911 P.2d 748, 751
(Idaho 1995). The court reaffirmed, however, that in Idaho "proprietary rights to use water... are held subject to the public trust." Id.at
750.
92. IDAHO CODE §58-1203(2). The political background for this
measure is provided at Michael C. Blumm et al., Renouncing the Public
Trust Doctrine: An Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24
EcoLocw L.Q. 461 (1997).
93. IDAHO CONST. art. XV, §1. All three possible bases for the invalidity of Idaho's public trust statute are considered in detail in Blumm
et al., supra note 92. For a defense of the statute, see Robert E. Bakes,
Can The Legislature Change The Public Trust Doctrine? The Idaho Experience,
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the legislation is valid, however, it not only cuts off one doctrinal
basis for water project reform but also stands as a symbol of refusal - a rejection of the trend all over the West to modify dam
operations to reduce the environmental impact from water development. Idaho has participated in that trend in the past, although only to a very limited extent.94 Yet at present Idaho is
maintaining a counter-revolutionary stance on water project reoperation,95 manifesting at the state level the attitude toward environmental protection reflected at the federal level by the leadership of the 104th Congress.96
VIII.

CONCLUSION

From one point of view, to reoperate water projects to address
the severe degradation often characteristic of those projects can
be seen as consonant with the agenda of the modem environmental protection movement. Externalities are gradually being
internalized, consistent with the widely accepted principle of polluter - here, diverter - pays. Alternatively, Western water
projects can be viewed as reclaiming the notion that water is fundamentally a public resource, that there is a community interest
in water which transcends the ambitions of individual users. As
noted by the late Allen Broussard,9 author of the California Supreme Court's Mono Basin decision, alongside the economic
benefits of appropriative water rights there is a community stake
in "the people's common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands
in 15TH ANNUAL

WATER LAW CONFERENCE - IN-DEPTH UPDATE

1-4 (Ameri-

can Bar Association Section of Natural Resources, Energy, and Environmental Law ed., 1997).
94. TIM PALMER, THE SNAKE RIVER: WINDOW TO THE WEST 141-45
(1991). Ironically the very year public trust doctrine limitation legislation was enacted in Idaho, the doctrine served as the basis for rejecting
a proposal for a new dam on the Snake River. See Blumm et al., supra
note 92, at 477.
95. See Bakes, supra note 93.
96. See Donna Cassata, Agenda for 105th Unlikely To Follow That of

104th, 54 CONG. Q. 3123, 3139-48 (1996).
97. During the early 1980s, Broussard - known as a passionate liberal - was "one of the most prolific" writers of majority opinions on
the California Supreme Court. Harriet Chiang, The Death of a Friend,
Colleague and Guiding Light, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 24, 1996, at 7.
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and tidelands." 98 That community interest is now gradually being
reclaimed for a number of rivers, lakes and estuaries in the West.

98. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Ct., 658 P.2d 709, 724
(Cal.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).

